ON COSTS ALLOCATION AT CIRCULAR ROUTE CONVEYING
Abstract
An applied problem of finding an optimal distribution of benefits among members of some cooperative transportation of goods is considered. The theory of cooperative games as a basic model is used and some concepts of this theory are discussed . The notions of the Shapley vector, the nucleolus and the nucleolus per capita are applied to describe optimal vectors of payoffs and value vectors. The algorithms for constructing these vectors are proposed, and all optimal value vectors for the proposed problem are found.
References
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Review
For citations:
Dotsenko S.I. ON COSTS ALLOCATION AT CIRCULAR ROUTE CONVEYING. Informatics. 2017;(1(53)):12-19. (In Russ.)
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